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INTRODUCTION

For centuries, nations granted full immunity from suit to foreign
sovereigns in all aspects of their relationships.1 Today, however, the
United States, like most nations, requires foreign sovereigns to account

for their commercial activities that occur in or affect the United States.23

Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")
clearly incorporates this requirement, considerable confusion has ensued
regarding the statute's retroactive application. This Comment attempts
to clear this confusion and to provide a solution to the issue of FSIA

retroactivity.
The FSIA, which sought to clarify the instances in which foreign

states may be sued in U.S. courts, 4 codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which the executive branch had formally adopted in
1952 when it issued the Tate Letter.5 In the Tate Letter, the State Department publicly took the position that henceforth it would recommend
to U.S. courts that as a matter of policy, a foreign state should be granted
immunity only for its sovereign or public acts, and not for its private
acts.6

Accordingly, the FSIA sets forth the general rule that "a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States,"'7 and then lists several specific exceptions to the general rule.8
These exceptions encompass thejure gestionis (private acts) referred to in
the Tate Letter,9 and they now provide the sole basis for state and federal
1 This practice derives from the ancient doctrine of Rex non potest paccare ("the King can do
no wrong"). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (5th ed. 1979). For a review of the doctrine's history, see R. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES-THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1974).
2 For a listing and comparison of sovereign immunity legislation in various countries, see generally B. BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEw (1984).
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) [hereinafter FSIA]. The FSIA is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d),
and 1602-1611. For convenience, the provisions of the FSIA will be referred to by their respective
U.S. Code section numbers.
4 See infra notes 105-131 and accompanying text.
5 "According to the.., restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign
is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (fure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to
private acts (fure gestionis)." Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep't of
State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. The doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity differs
from the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, which has no exceptions.
6 Id.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
8 These exceptions, such as expropriation claims and commercial activities, are outlined at infra
note 110 and accompanying text.
9 Tate Letter, supra note 5.
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court jurisdiction over suits against foreign states."°
Although this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was adopted
in the Tate Letter, the theory as codified in the FSIA differs substantially
from prior practice both substantively and procedurally. 1' Thus, there
has been considerable debate concerning the retroactive effect of the
FSIA-that is, whether the statute applies to claims which arose before
the statute was enacted.
Three recently decided cases discuss the retroactive application of
the FSIA to pre-1952 claims-Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,'" Jackson v. People'sRepublic of China,'3 and Slade v.
United States of Mexico. 4 These cases have conclusively established that
the FSIA is not to be applied retroactively to pre-1952 events-i.e., to
claims arising prior to the issuance of the Tate Letter. 5 They do not
resolve the issue of retroactive application of the FSIA to post-1952
events, however, and this issue is currently engulfed in confusion. 6
This Comment attempts to resolve this confusion and propose a solution to the retroactivity problem. Section II delineates the retroactivity
issue, while Section III discusses the history of sovereign immunity and
describes the FSIA in detail. Section IV outlines the sources of confusion
in the area of FSIA retroactivity and identifies four basic principles

which may be applied to circumvent the confusion. Finally, Section V
proposes a retroactivity solution arrived at through the application of

these principles.
10 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Negeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See infra note 121 for a
more extensive list of citations.
11 See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
12 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S.
Ct. 2874 (1988).
13 596 F. Supp. 386, aff'd, 74 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
14 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.C.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S.
1032, reh'g denied, 480 U.S. 912 (1987).
15 See infra notes 132-152 and accompanying text.
16 Upon initial observation, it appears that because the FSIA has now been in effect for more
than a decade, applicable statutes of limitations would moot the FSIA retroactivity issue. The Jackson, Slade, and CarlMarks cases, however, are proof that claims upon such grounds as the repudiation of international debt may remain viable forever because no statute of limitations bars claims
against international debt obligations. As one prominent author noted: "There is no statute of
limitations as to international claims," and "[g]overnments are presumed to be always ready to do
justice, and whether a claim be a day or a century old, so that it is well-founded, every principle of
natural equity, of sound morals, requires it to be paid." J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW §§ 1052, 1003 (1906).
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II. THE RETROACTIVITY ISSUE
A.

Applicable Definitions

Before undertaking this discussion of retroactivity, it is necessary to
define the underlying concepts. In fact, the failure to identify the proper
definition of the word "retroactive" is a major source of confusion in
discussions of retroactive application of the law.17
Courts discussing FSIA retroactivity commonly use the term "retroactive" in two senses. On the one hand, the term refers to the broad
proposition that all new laws apply to past events to some extent. 18 This
sense of retroactive will hereinafter be referred to as "preactive."' 9 On
the other hand, the term also refers to the more specific proposition that
some new laws apply to past events and change the consequences of these
events.2" This latter sense is considered the "legal" definition of the
term, and it refers to laws which take away, impair, or change rights
acquired under existing laws with respect to transactions already past.2 1
From a legal viewpoint, a statute is not generally regarded as operating retroactively simply because it relates to antecedent events.22 Thus,
this Comment will rely on the legal definition of retroactive rather than
the preactive definition of the term. Although the term "retroactive"
may also encompass notions of "retrospectivity, ' ' 23 for the purposes of
this Comment, any subtle distinctions between the two terms are insignificant. 24 Therefore, this Comment will treat the terms as synonymous, as
17 Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF.

L. REV. 216 (1960) [hereinafter Slawson].
18 Comment, Retroactive Application of Statutes: Protection of Reliance Interests, 40 ME. L. REv.
183 (1988) [hereinafter Retroactive Application].
19 This term is coined by this Comment.
20 This latter sense of "retroactive" also embodies a historical antipathy to such laws due to the
fact that these laws commonly disrupt settled expectations. Retroactive Application, supranote 18, at
183. See also Smead, Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence,20
MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936) (tracing the development of this rule from ancient Greek and Roman
codes to U.S. jurisprudence) [hereinafter Smead]; infra text accompanying notes 28-39.
21 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511 (1885).
22 Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U.S. 452 (1913). For example, it has been held that a statute which
only codifies common morality and fairness and introduces no new rule is not retroactive in any
sense. Id.
23 Retrospectivity, unlike retroactivity, directly relates to a law or statute changing the legal
consequences of prior events. When the events occurred, certain legal consequences resulted, and a
retrospective statute gives new legal consequences to these prior events. See DeMars, Retrospectivity
and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 253, 254-257 (1983) [hereinafter DeMars].
24 These distinctions remain insignificant even though commentators have frequently attempted
to shed light upon the nuances between "retroactive" and "retrospective." See, e.g., id. at 254-57
(distinguishing retroactivity from retrospectivity and noting that treating the terms as synonymous
"obfuscates differences which may hinder the accomplishment of important legislative and societal
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do the vast majority of courts.25
As a result, for purposes of this Comment, a "retroactive" and/or
"retrospective" statute is defined as "one which gives to pre-enactment
conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute."2 6 A "preactive" statute, on the other
hand, is defined more broadly as one which merely gives legal effect to
pre-enactment conduct. Finally, a "prospective" statute is legislation
which gives legal effect to post-enactment conduct-i. e., it applies to the
future.2 7 All retroactive statutes therefore apply "preactively" to preenactment conduct, whereas a "preactive" statute need not apply retroactively. Moreover, because nearly every statute applies prospectively,
most retroactive and preactive statutes likewise apply prospectively. It is
thus the change in legal effects of pre-enactment conduct that is at the
heart of "retroactive" statutes under this definition.
B.

Historical Objections to Retroactive Law

There are no objections to either the preactive or purely prospective
application of statutes. On the other hand, a strong historical hostility
exists toward the retroactive application of statutes.2 " The Constitution
of the United States expressly prohibits the passage of ex post facto
laws,29 bills of attainder,3" and laws impairing the obligation of con-

tract,3" which are all characterized by retroactivity. A bias against retroactive laws has also extended to other types of retroactive statutes not

goals"); Slawson, supra note 17, at 217-18 (defining and distinguishing between "method retroactivity" and "vested rights retroactivity"); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights (pt. 1), 5 TEx. L.
REv. 231, 232-33 (1927) (describing three different ideas behind the term "retrospective") [hereinafter Smith (pt. 1)].
25 See 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 41.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter
SUTHERLAND], where it is stated that: "The terms 'retroactive' and 'retrospective' are synonymous
in judicial usage and may be employed interchangeably ....
Characterization thus may do nothing
more than reflect a judgment concerning validity or interpretation, arrived at on other grounds."
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1184 C" 'retroactive' or 'retrospective'
laws are generally defined from a legal viewpoint as those which take away or impair vested rights
acquired under existing laws, create new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in
respect to the transactions or considerations already past").
26 Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 692, 692 (1960) [hereinafter Hochman].
27 For a delineation of the retroactive and prospective concepts, see Beytagh, Ten Years ofNonRetroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal,61 VA. L. REV. 1557 n.2 (1975) [hereinafter Beytagh].
28 In fact, retroactive laws have been disfavored since the times of ancient Greece and Rome.
Smead, supra note 20, at 775.
29 See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
30 Ide
31 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights (pt. 2), 6 TEX. L.
REV. 409, 412-13 (1928) [hereinafter Smith (pt. 2)].
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expressly banned by the Constitution. 32 One commentator has even suggested that retroactivity must be isolated from its "evil associations"
rooted in "political philosophy" before it can be properly evaluated as a
legal principle.3 3
The most fundamental objection to retroactive laws is that such laws
are unjust. Legal vehemence arises because of the perceived and actual
unfairness of legislation which changes the legal consequences of events
which have occurred prior to the enactment of a statute.3 4 Implicit in
such belief is the notion that "notice or warning of the rules" which are
to be applied to determine the affairs of people should be given to them in
advance of their actions.3 In addition, retroactive laws disrupt the certainty of the past, because settled matters become open to reinterpretation.3 6 Moreover, a legislative body may pass a retroactive law with
knowledge of exactly who will be affected, rather than with the detached
concern of a policy-maker.3 7
Despite these historical biases against retroactive laws, many laws
are in fact retroactively applied. Apart from the specific provisions already cited, the Constitution contains no express prohibition of retroactive legislation.3 8 Indeed, it is well established that the legislature may
enact a statute having retroactive effect.3 9 Consistent with the common
law's antipathy toward retroactive application, however, courts interpret
statutes as applying prospectively, absent clear indication of legislative
intent to the contrary or other grounds that nullify this antipathy.
32 Justice Story called such retroactive statutes "generally unjust." 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1398 (1851).

33 Smith (pt. 2), supra note 31, at 414.
34 In many cases, actions challenging these laws allege violations of substantive due process.
There is also a procedural due process aspect in that the one challenging the retroactivity may be
able to assert that there was not sufficient notice of the change or knowledge of the new law. Agustin
v. Quern, 611 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1979). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS TO THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 642-644 (Cambridge Tent. ed.

1958).
35 2 SUTHERLAND, supranote 25, § 41.02, at 247. This conclusion is an aspect of both substantive and procedural due process. See supra note 34.
36 Hochman, supra note 26, at 692-93.
37 Smith (pt. 2), supra note 31, at 417. This knowledge not only goes against the common law
tradition of the legislator as a prescriber of future, impersonal policies, but it also, if instituted judicially, goes against the common law tradition of the judge as an impartial decisionmaker regarding
known parties. Id.; Hochman, supra note 26, at 693.
38 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219
U.S. 140 (1911); League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902); Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173 (1877).
39 This principle embodies a historical presumption in favor of legislative sovereignty. Smead,
supra note 20, at 778.
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C. Differing Methods of Interpretation
Various methodologies have evolved to determine whether a statute
overcomes the historical antipathies toward retroactive application when
the legislature has failed to state clearly whether the law is to be applied
retroactively. These methodologies fall within four groups: (1) general
legislative intent analysis; (2) the vested rights approach; (3) definitional
analysis; and (4) the Linkletter/Stovall test.'
General legislative intent analysis involves the consultation of a
wide variety of statutory materials, and the ranking of such materials in a
hierarchical fashion, to ascertain the original intent of the legislators as
to retroactive application.4 1 If the text of a statute does not disclose such
intent, extrinsic sources, "such as the statutory history, the circumstances of enactment, contemporaneous, related statutes, and the legal
meaning of statutory terms," are consulted.4'
The problem with using such a general mode of analysis to determine the retroactivity of a statute is that it creates too many opportunities for a court to read its own policy preferences into the statute.4 3
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous and/or the legislative intent is uncertain, legislative intent analysis can easily lead to a decision
for either side. To base retroactive application solely on general legislative analysis without a more definitive answer in these circumstances
conflicts with the well-settled principle against retroactive application absent clear legislative intent. Thus, where there is no clear legislative intent, the court should turn to other more meaningful methodologies in
order to arrive at the proper conclusion regarding retroactivity.
The "vested rights" approach' to determining retroactivity is
founded upon the following principle: statutes which take away vested
rights come within the general rule disfavoring the retroactive operation
of statutes and therefore may not be retroactively applied. Under this
retroactivity by determining
approach, the court resolves the issue of
46
rights."1
"vested
affects
statute
a
whether
40 Although the Linkletter/Stovalltest traditionally has been applied to judicial rulings to determine their retroactive effect, its application has at times tangentially involved statutes (as where
determination has been made of the retroactivity of case decisions interpreting statutes). See infra
notes 57-76.
41 Retroactive Application, supra note 18, at 189.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 This approach has also been referred to as the "vested right-remedial scheme." DeMars, supra
note 23, at 274.
45 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. at 511. See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 354 (1974).
46 Numerous courts have employed this "vested rights" analysis. For a table of cases espousing
this principle, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41.06, at 378-80 n.l.
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The vested rights methodology is often criticized. For instance, one
author stated:
Judicial opinions are full of standards which purport to govern decision[s]
concerning the legality of retroactive application of new law. On close examination most of them turn out to be little more than ways to restate the
problem. Probably the most hackneyed example of such a rule is to the
effect that a law cannot be retroactively applied to impair vested rights. But
the statement of that proposition does nothing more than focus attention on
the question concerning
what circumstances qualify a right to be character47
ized as "vested.",

Commentators have long recognized the impossibility of clearly defining a vested right and have instead relied upon the circuitous definition
that "a right is vested when it is immune to destruction, and ... is not
vested when it is liable to destruction, by retroactive legislation. '48 Likewise, the term "vested right" has been used by the courts in circuitous
fashion. 49 The conclusory nature of the vested rights analysis is a product of the impossibility of defining "vested rights." Instead of arriving at
a clear definition, courts are forced to define the term in terms of itself,
or, in other words, to "beg the question." One court, recognizing the
conclusory nature of this analysis, stated:
"Vested" rights may not be retroactively impaired by statute; [yet] a right is
"vested" when it is so far perfected as to permit no statutory interference.
The tautology is apparent. As was pointed out by Justice Holmes, "for
legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination
of a substance supporting the fact that [the public] force will be brought to
bear upon those who do things said to contravene it . .

.50

As a result, the employment of the "vested rights" approach to determine retroactivity is as problematic as the employment of the general
legislative intent analysis where no clear intent is apparent. The conclusory nature of the vested rights approach does not provide for a meaningful analysis of the implications of retroactively applied law, because it
merely rests the resolution of the issue of retroactivity upon the illusory
definition of "vested rights."
Nevertheless, a third methodology has grown out of the vested
rights approach through the recognition of what is not included within
47 Id. § 41.05, at 364-65.

48 Smith (pt. 2), supra note 31, at 231.
49 See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885), where the Supreme Court stated that this
term is used as implying interests which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect and of
which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. For a compilation of examples from the case law of what rights have been considered vested and nonvested, see SUTHERLAND,
supra note 25, § 41.06, at 376-77.
50 Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1979) (quoting Holmes, Natural
Law, 32 HARv. L. REV.40, 42 (1918)).
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the definition of "vested rights." This approach to retroactive interpretation is the "definitional analysis."5 Because it has become firmly established that there is no vested right in any particular mode of procedure or
remedy,5 2 the definitional approach involves the determination

of

whether the statute under consideration is substantive or procedural.
Procedural or remedial statutes, on the one hand, are not within the general rule against retroactive operation and thus are generally held to operate retroactively.5 3 On the other hand, if a statute is substantive,
retroactive application is denied.5 4
Problems with this definitional analysis arise out of the difficulty in
distinguishing between a substantive and procedural statute or provision.5 5 The general rule is that "laws which fix duties, establish rights
and responsibilities among and for persons, natural or otherwise, are
'substantive laws' in character, while those which merely prescribe the
manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be exercised and
enforced in a court are 'procedural laws.' "56 Although trouble arises in
borderline cases, this methodology nevertheless holds up where a statute
is clearly procedural or remedial.

The final methodology the courts have employed to determine the
retroactive application of law is the Linkletter/Stovall test. Although
this test was initially formulated to determine the retroactive application
of judicially created rules of law, employment of the test has also tangentially involved statutes.5 7 In order to provide for a more meaningful

analysis of retroactivity, this Comment proposes that the Linkletteri
Stovall test, which has successfully and widely been used to determine
51 See Retroactive Application, supra note 18, at 190-92.
52 See, eg., Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Henley v.
Myers, 76 Kan. 723, 93 P. 168 (1907), aff'd, 215 U.S. 373 (1910).
53 Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Idaho 1955). See Spicer v. Benefit Ass'n of
Ry. Employees, 142 Or. 574, 21 P.2d 187 (1933) (no person has a vested right in any particular mode
of procedure or remedy; accordingly, a cause must be tried under the rules of procedure existing at
the time of the trial); Lewis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 220 Pa. 317, 69 A. 821 (1908) (no one can claim to
have a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his right).
54 See Retroactive Application, supra note 18, at 191.
55 This encompasses a whole area of law in itself. Id. at 192.
56 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1083. See State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit
Court, 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
57 For instance, in determining the retroactivity of holdings interpreting statutes and the rules
springing from such holdings, employment of the test often involves the analysis of statutes. See, eg.,
United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827, 831-32 (8th Cir. 1979) (examining the purpose of the
statute of limitations for the Federal Tort Claims Act); Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90,
94 (8th Cir. 1978) (examining the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Novak v. Harris, 504 F.
Supp. 101, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (examining the purpose of Social Security Act).
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the retroactivity of judicial rulings, should likewise be used to determine
the retroactivity of statutes.
As is the case with the enactment of a new statute that changes prior
practice, the judicial creation of a new rule of law also raises the essential
question of whether such rules should be applied retroactively. In Linkletter v. Walker,5 8 the Supreme Court outlined various principles which
ultimately set the stage for a new methodology to answer this question.59
The Court first concluded that the way to approach retroactivity was to
"weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."60 The Court also
considered the degree of reliance on the prior standards and the consequences retroactivity would have on the administration of justice.6 '
Nevertheless, what has often been referred to as the Linkletter test
was actually solidified in Stovall v. Denno,6 2 a case decided two years
after Linkletter. In Stovall, the Supreme Court transformed the three
elements of purpose, reliance, and effect into a foundation upon which
the future retroactivity analysis of the Supreme Court would proceed.6 3
This test involves a balancing of the purpose of the new rule, the reasonableness and extent of reliance on the overturned law, and the effect of a
retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice.'
In considering the first prong of the Linkletter/Stovall test, a court
must search for the purpose of the new rule and the impact retroactivity
would have upon that purpose.6 5 For example, in Linkletter the Court
held that the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio 66 was inapplicable to cases in which convictions had become final before the date
Mapp was decided, because the deterrent purpose of Mapp would not be
served by retroactive application.67 In other words, the purpose of the
new rule involved deterrence, and one can not deter what has already
58 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
59 See Beytagh, supra note 27; Corr, -Retroactivity A Study in Supreme CourtDoctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. REv. 745 (1983) (criticizing the Linkletter doctrine on the basis of confusion and
inconsistencies present in lower federal court decisions) [hereinafter Corr].
60 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639.
61 Id. at 637-38.
62 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

63 See Corr, supra note 59, at 747. See also Beytagh, supra note 27, at 1556.
64 While both Linkletter and Stovall concerned criminal defendants, the Supreme Court made it
clear in 1971 that this doctrine regarding retroactivity was to be applied in civil cases as well. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
65 Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241-43 (1977).
66 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
67 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 618.
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68

been done.
In considering the second prong of the test, a court searches for
reliance on the old rule of law. 69 The cases show, however, that the mere
possibility of reliance is not enough to prevent retroactive application.
Instead, there must have been actual reliance before retroactivity will be
denied. The party seeking relief from retroactivity under the test must
therefore demonstrate that he or she actually depended upon the existing
state of the law-that he or she took some action, or refrained from taking some action, in compliance with what he or she believed the law to
be. For example, in Of Course,Inc. v. Commissioner,7" a corporation was
unable to resist the retroactive application of an unfavorable new rule
because it was "plain that the taxpayer was not influenced in any action
taken by [the old rule]. Its decision to liquidate and the procedure followed would have been the same whether [the old rule] prevailed or
71

not.2

Finally, under the third prong of the test, a court must make a determination as to the equities involved or the effect of retroactivity upon
the administration of justice. 72 This effect factor usually weighs in favor

of retroactivity if the court is unable to identify a consequence that is
68 In addition, as previously mentioned, when a law-changing judicial decision affects a statute
(e.g., by changing its interpretation or by striking some portion of the statute as unconstitutional),
courts frequently must also look beyond the purpose of the decision to the purpose of the underlying
statute. In Travis v. Trust Company Bank, 621 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had failed to disclose the assignment of a security interest as required by
statute. Initially, the pivotal question was whether the item assigned was a security interest. While
the case was pending, the court ruled in a separate case that the item was a security interest. The
focus of Travis therefore became the retroactivity of the intervening decision. The court examined
the purpose of the statute and found that the purpose included the attempt to deter sharp lending
practices and to ensure that lenders did not take unfair advantage of debtors. The court thereby
concluded that the purpose factor of the Linkletter/Stovalltest weighed in favor of retroactivity, and
decided in favor of retroactive application. Id. at 150-51.
For other cases looking toward the purpose of the statute under consideration to resolve the
question of a decision's retroactivity, see United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827, 831-32 (8th Cir.
1979); Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90, 94 (8th Cir. 1978); Novak v. Harris, 504 F.
Supp. 101, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
69 Notice how this prong incorporates the historical antipathies toward retroactive laws.
70 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
71 Id. at 759-60. Similarly, in Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 470 F. Supp. 414 (D. Del. 1979),
aff'd, 623 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1980), the City of Wilmington argued against the retroactive application
of a law-changing decision on the ground that the new law, subjecting cities to legal as well as
equitable remedies for civil rights violations, was a drastic departure from precedent. The court
rejected the argument because the city was unable to show that "the earlier decision established a
rule of substantive conduct on which the municipality relied." Id. at 418. See also In re Spell, 650
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1981).
72 The Linkletter court pondered the implications of retroactivity on the judicial system, whereas
the Chevron court described the third factor as "the inequity imposed by retroactive application."
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637; Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107.
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either fundamentally unfair or is laden with real-world implications for
the operation of administrative or judicial bodies.
The NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford7 case is an example of a court's
inability to identify a fundamentally unfair consequence resulting from
retroactive application of a rule. The case involved a new rule promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board which provided back pay
for unlawfully discharged striking employees who had not asked for reinstatement to their jobs.74 Holding in favor of retroactivity, the court
said:
[R]etroactive application will not create substantial injustice or undue hardship for either party. The Board finds no valid reason for distinguishing
between the status of an unlawfully discharged striker and of an unlawfully
discharged working employee. Contrary to the Company's claim, the rule
enforced here does not provide a windfall to striking employees but merely
places the burden of undoing the wrong on the wrongdoer, where it seems
properly to belong.7 5

Other cases have denied retroactivity through addressing the potential
adverse administrative impacts of retroactivity.7 6
Although the second and third prongs of the Linkletter/Stovall test
may be difficult to measure, this test articulates a more meaningful basis
for considering the problem of retroactive application of statutes than the
alternative methodologies discussed above.77
III.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
UNDER U.S. LAW

A.

Absolute Sovereign Immunity

To understand the concepts the FSIA and Tate Letter encompass, it
is helpful first to delineate the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in
U.S. courts. Although Article III of the Constitution expressly includes
73 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
74 Id.

75 Id. at 757.
76 See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973) (refusing retroactive application of O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), because such a result would produce significant judicial and administrative costs); Novak v. Harris, 504 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
77 The only other methods discovered in the course of my research which are used to interpret
the retroactive implications of statutes are the "due process" and "reliance" approaches, which have
been incorporated into the above four methodologies, and the "curative" approach, which is not
applicable to the FSIA and thus is not considered by this Comment. Slawson, supra note 17, at 216;
Comment, Release of Joint Tortfeasors- Virginia Code Section &01-35.1 and Its Retroactive Application, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 829, 846 (1984) [hereinafter Release of Joint Tortfeasors]; Rogers v. Keokuk, 154 U.S. 546 (1918) ("curative" acts operate on conditions already existing and, in a sense, can
have no prospective operation; so long as such acts do not interfere with contract rights, they must
be given retroactive effect).
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suits against "foreign states" within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts,7" the Supreme Court held in 1812 that foreign sovereigns
were immune from suits in U.S. courts in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.7 9 For more than a century and a half following this case, the

United States generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity
from suit under this doctrine of "absolute sovereign immunity." Nevertheless, signs of strain with respect to this doctrine began to emerge in
the first quarter of the twentieth century.
In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,8 ° the Supreme Court relied on

the Schooner Exchange holding to extend immunity in an action against
a merchant ship owned and controlled by the Italian government."1 In
reaching its decision, the Court declined to adhere to the State Department's view that "government-owned merchant vessels.., employed in
' ' s2
commerce should not be regarded as entitled to . . . immunit[y].
Thus, the Court refused to recognize what is now the "commercial activity" exception to sovereign immunity, even though the State Department

promoted such recognition.
Differences of opinion on the issue also existed within the executive
branch as early as 1918, as evidenced by an exchange of letters between
the Attorney General and the Secretary of State."3 By the 1940s, the
Supreme Court leaned toward a policy of deference to the executive
branch on a case-by-case basis: "It is therefore not for the courts to deny
78 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
79 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). This doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity was later explained more fully in United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. (7 Cranch) 520 (1875), as follows:
A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. His own dignity, as welll as
the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in
the courts of another sovereignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed. Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of another
nation, must seek redress through his own government. His sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it need not be considered. If this responsibility is assumed,
the claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts, as
of right, but by diplomacy, or, if need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign against whom the
demand is made to determine for himself what he will do in respect to it. He may pay or reject
it; he may submit to arbitration, open his own courts to suit, or consent to be tried in the courts
of another nation. All depends upon himself.
For other reasons underlying this early doctrine of absolute immunity, see Comment, Sovereign
Immunity and the Foreign-StateEnterprisein Alaska, 4 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 343, 347-48 (1975).
80 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
81 Id. at 572.
82 The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479-80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (quoted in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945)).
83 Whereas the Attorney General asserted that foreign merchant vessels were entitled to immunity, the Secretary of State asserted that such vessels were not so entitled. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69, at 211 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
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an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an
immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. ',' This policy alleviated some of the differences between the
Supreme Court and the State Department. It was the State Depart-

ment's ordinary practice, however, to request immunity in all actions
against friendly foreign sovereigns,85 while the Supreme Court applied
deference only in cases where the State Department had certified the entitlement to immunity.86 Eventually, the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity slowly began to lose momentum, and in 1952 it gave way to
restrictive sovereign immunity.
B.

Restrictive Sovereign Immunity and the Issuance
of the Tate Letter

The theory of absolute sovereign immunity was abandoned in 1952
when the State Department issued the well-known "Tate Letter" announcing that the Department would no longer assert immunity on be-

half of friendly foreign sovereigns in suits arising from private or
commercial activity.8 7 Thereafter, this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity became the prevailing law in the United States.8 8 Under the restrictive theory, "the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard
to sovereign or public acts (jureimperii) of a state, but not with respect to

private acts (ure gestionis)."89
Numerous problems arose with regard to the application of the new
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. First, the executive branch
often made determinative suggestions to the judiciary as to whether immunity should be granted in a particular case, based on politics or current foreign relation policies.9 ° Thus, decisions regarding immunity
84 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)); RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, at 212-13.

85 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.
86 See supra note 84.
87 Tate Letter, supranote 5. Because the federal courts defer to an assertion of sovereign immunity made by the Department of State on behalf of a foreign sovereign, the Department's definition
of the scope of sovereign immunity was determined to be controlling. See Pugh & McLaughlin,
JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 25, 55-64 (1966) [hereinafter Pugh &
McLaughlin].
88 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
89 Tate Letter, supra note 5.
90 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). The Court stated that: "The conduct
of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Id. at 302. See
also Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (example of political pressure often involved in
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under the newly announced standards were often arbitrary and inconsistent. 91 As the Supreme Court noted in the Jackson case,
After the Tate Letter the executive, acting through the State Department,
usually would make "suggestions" on whether sovereign immunity should
be recognized by a court, and courts generally abided [by] these sugges-

tions. This proved troublesome, because foreign nations at times placed
diplomatic pressure on the State Department, and political considerations
led to suggestions of immunity where it was not available under the restrictive theory.... Moreover, foreign nations did not always make requests to
the State Department, and responsibility fell to the courts to determine

whether sovereign immunity existed. With two different branches involved
the governing standards were neither clear nor uniform. 92

Second, vast problems regarding implementation of the restrictive
doctrine arose, including the courts' difficulty in interpreting the distinction between public and private acts. In the absence of a clear method
for determining whether a given act of a foreign government should be
considered public or private, employment of the restrictive theory often
begged the question of immunity, rather than answering it. 93
Courts and commentators formulated several tests to distinguish between commercial and governmental acts. Some tests focused on the
"nature" of the act, classifying as sovereign those acts which could only
be performed by the sovereign, 94 whereas others preferred the "purpose"
test, under which an act would be considered sovereign if performed for a
public purpose.9
granting of sovereign immunity); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (stating that if
the State Department failed to determine a petition for immunity, the court was authorized to do so
itself).

91 See Comment, FederalJurisdictionOver Foreign Citizens' Nonfederal Claims Against Foreign

Sovereigns Held Constitutional, 14 SETON HALL L. RaV. 598 (1984) [hereinafter FederalJurisdiction
OverForeign Citizens'NonfederalClaims]. Commentators have criticized the political undertones of
the State Department's then-existing system of determining sovereign immunity issues and the inconsistent results which were produced by having both the executive and judiciary branches involved. Id. at 614.
92 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1493 (citing Verlinden BV. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
487-88 (1983)).

93 Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 901-09 (1969).
94 See Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), aff'd, 17 A.D.2d 927, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div. 1962).
95 See, eg., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
In Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965), the court adopted yet another test which declared that a foreign goverment
should be immune from suit for acts that fell within the following categories: "(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and (5) public loans." The court
observed that under the "nature" test, certain activities traditionally considered exclusively within
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Third, under the Tate Letter's theory of sovereign immunity, there
was no clear way to secure in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state.
Because the assertion of jurisdiction inherently involved the imposition
of judicial power over the party,9 6 a claimant could not "simply serve...
process on the physical embodiment of the foreign government, because
such embodiment-an embassy or consulate-is inviolable. Service on
an ambassador or minister of a foreign state [was] not only void, but
under a federal statute dating back to 1790 [was] a crime ...."9'
Thus, proceedings against a foreign government could be commenced only by an attachment against the government's property within
the United States.9" In rem jurisdiction, involving claims to title of the
attached property, or quasi in rem jurisdiction, such as attaching a bank
deposit, were therefore the "ultimate recourse open to private litigants"
because of the "lack of in personam jurisdiction against foreign sovereigns." 99 Unfortunately, in the international arena, the reliance on in
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction has a major drawback-the attachment
of such property is an irritant in U.S. foreign relations. 10 0
Fourth, the right to sue a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts under the
Tate Letter in many cases was essentially "a right without a remedy."
Despite the Tate Letter's adoption of the restrictive theory as to the right
to sue a foreign sovereign, the absolute theory continued to apply to the
execution of judgments. As one commentator noted: "A private litigant
might have defeated a defense of immunity from suit in a purely commercial action against a foreign state, only to be frustrated in its efforts to
the realm of governments, such as the purchase of bullets or shoes for an army, would be characterized as commercial. The "purpose" test was considered even more unsatisfactory, "for conceptually
the modem sovereign always acts for a public purpose." Id. at 359-60. This test was subsequently
followed in a number of decisions. See, e.g., Sea Transp. Corp. v. The S/T Manhattan, 405 F. Supp.
1244, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298,
1302 (N.D. 11. 1975).
96 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 622-30 (2d ed. 1977).

97 Lowenfeld, Litigatinga Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 377,
384 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
98 See Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 87, at 28-33.
99 Delaume, Three Perspectiveson Sovereign Immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977); Note,
JurisdictionalImmunities of ForeignStates, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1225, 1239 (1974).
100 See von Mehren, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 33, 46-47 (1978) [hereinafter von Mehren]. As the Congress has stated: "Such attachments can
give rise to serious friction in United States' foreign relations. In some cases, plaintiffs obtain numerous attachments over a variety of foreign government assets found in various parts of the United
States. This shotgun approach has caused significant irritation to many foreign governments." H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604,
6615 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 1487].
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collect upon the resulting judgment."1 ° The State Department made
this clear in a letter filed with the court in Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank.10 2 Judgments against a foreign sovereign thus merely formed
a basis for possible enforcement outside the United States, or for a request that the Department of State present a diplomatic claim to the foreign government on behalf of the plaintiff. 0 In any case, the recovery of
the award granted was dependent upon the goodwill of the foreign

government.1 04
C. The FSIA and the Codification of Restrictive Sovereign Immunity
Hoping to eradicate the problems that plagued the application of the
Tate Letter, Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976.105 Viewed broadly, the
FSIA 10 6 encompassed four basic purposes or strategies 10 7 designed to
clarify the instances in which foreign states10 8 may be sued in U.S.
courts. These four purposes, although solving the problems inherent in
101 Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions
Against ForeignStates, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 217 (1979) [hereinafter Kahale & Vega].
102 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959). The State Department maintained that the property of the foreign goverment should be "immune 'from execution or
other action analogous to execution.'" Id. at 1088, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
103 von Mehren, supra note 100, at 43.
104 Kahale & Vega, supra note 101, at 217.
105 The FSIA became effective on January 19, 1977, 90 days from the date it was signed by
President Ford. In his statement on signing the bill into law, the President said: "This statute will
... make it easier for our citizens and foreign governments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary
legal disputes. In this respect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act carries forward a modem and
enlightened trend in international law." 12 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1554 (Oct. 22, 1976).
106 The basic structure of the FSIA in Title 28 of the U.S. Code is as follows:
§ 1330: Actions against foreign states (jurisdiction)
§ 1602: Findings and declaration of purpose
§ 1603: Definitions
§ 1604: Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
§ 1605: General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
§ 1606: Extent of liability
§ 1607: Counterclaims
§ 1608: Service; time to answer; default
§ 1609: Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign state
§ 1610: Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution
§ 1611: Certain types of property immune from execution
A detailed section-by-section analysis of the FSIA was provided in the House Report prior to its
enactment. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, at 12.
107 See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, at 45 (in their letter of transmittal, the Departments
of State and Justice commented on the proposed legislation and outlined these strategies). Legislative history also points to a fifth purpose of the FSIA-to not affect the substantive law of liability.
See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
108 The FSIA defines "foreign state" to include the foreign state itself, its political subdivisions,
and its agencies or instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). The term "political subdivisions" includes
"all governmental units beneath the central government, including local goovernments." H.R. Rep.
No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6613.
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the Tate Letter, also resulted in major changes to prior practice which
are at the heart of the debate concerning FSIA retroactivity.
First, the primary purpose of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity enunciated in the Tate Letter. Accordingly, the FSIA sets forth the general rule that "a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States," 10 9 and
then lists several specific exceptions to that rule."O The largest and most
important of these exceptions is the so-called "commercial activity" exception.II Under this exception, the determination as to whether a particular act is commercial or governmental is to be made by reference to
the nature of the act and not to its purpose."' By selecting the "nature
of the act" test to distinguish between actsjure imperii and actsjure gestionis, the FSIA thus dissipated much of the confusion plaguing this portion of the prior law," 3 and helped to alleviate the difficulty the courts
previously encountered in distinguishing between private and public
acts.1 4
The second major objective of the FSIA was to depoliticize the issue
of sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for its resolution ex-

clusively in the hands of the judiciary.'

15

Thus, under the FSIA, private

litigants will no longer be forced to compete with the foreign policy interests of the United States through the politicizing of the State Department. n 6 As a result, the problems associated with having two branches
109 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
110 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607. Such exceptions include: (1) noncommercial torts; (2) litigation concerning gift and inherited property; (3) waiver by the sovereign; (4) expropriation claims; and (5)
commercial activity. Id.
111 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
112 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6615.

113 This confusion is dissipated irrespective of the merits of the test selected. See supra note 95.
114 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Although the FSIA does not provide a precise
definition of "commercial activity" (this term is defined broadly as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act"), certain activities of a foreign
state-such as the sale or service of a product, leasing of property, borrowing of money, engagement
of employees, or investment in U.S. corporations-would now clearly constitute commercial activity
under the restrictive theory. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6615.
115 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6615. As
the FSIA declares:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states
to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would
protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts .... Claims of
foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of
the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1602.
116 The State Department itself will no longer be expected by a foreign government to accommo-
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of government decide the immunity issue are dissipated.
The third purpose of the FSIA was to fill a gap in the prior law by
providing well-defined rules for service of process upon foreign states,
thus creating a basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over foreign
states. Accordingly, the FSIA established a long-arm statute containing
service provisions to reach foreign sovereigns.1 17 In providing a basis for
in personam jurisdiction, the commercial activity exception denies immunity with respect to any claim based upon: (1) a commercial activity
"carried on in the United States;" (2) an act within the United States "in
connection with" a commercial activity elsewhere; or (3) an act outside
the United States "in connection with" a commercial activity elsewhere if
the act causes a "direct effect" in the United States.11 8 Thus, when a
foreign state engages in commercial activity anywhere, and that activity
has a "direct effect" in the United States, the foreign state can be subject
to suit under the FSIA.
Moreover, the FSIA not only provides bases for in personam jurisdiction, it makes such jurisdiction the exclusive form of jurisdiction
available. Indeed, the FSIA precludes all attachments of assets of foreign
states for jurisdictional purposes.1 19 As one commentator noted, the
FSIA "is a rare example of a common law state abandoning in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction in favor of exclusive in personam jurisdiction." 12 Accordingly, the District Court in the Carl Marks case stated
that "the FSIA is now the exclusive basis for federal court jurisdiction
over suits against a foreign sovereign, and a court lacks . . .personal
jurisdiction over the sovereign unless one of the exceptions . . . applies." 12' 1 This aspect of the FSIA not only provides the means to obtain
date its interests, while trying to uphold the legal principles espoused in the Tate Letter for a U.S.
citizen.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). As a congressional committee reported:
[Section 1330(b) of the FSIA] provides, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states
....The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied in
the provision.... [E]ach of the immunity provisions... requires some connection between the
lawsuit and the United States, or an express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its immunity from jurisdiction. These immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts
which must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. Besides incorporating
these jurisdictional contacts by reference, section 1330(b) also... prescrib[es] that proper service be made under section 1608 .... Thus, [these sections] are all carefully interconnected.
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6620.
118 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6620.
119 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610(d). Property of a foreign state may be attached prior to judgment
only if it is used for a commercial activity in the United States, the attachment is for security purposes, and the foreign state has expressly waived its immunity from such attachment. Id. After
judgment, attachment is allowed in aid of execution.
120 von Mehren, supra note 100, at 46 (footnotes omitted).
121 Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 335. The Jackson court likewise noted: "Both subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction turn on application of the substantive provisions of the FSIA.
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in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign which were absent
under prior practice, it also eliminates an unnecessary source of friction
between the United States and foreign governments by eliminating in
12
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 1
The final objective of the FSIA was to rectify the inconsistency
which existed between the rules of immunity from suit and the ability to
obtain execution of judgments. 123 As mentioned, prior to the enactment
of the FSIA, the absolute immunity theory continued to apply to the
execution of judgments, despite the Tate Letter's adoption of the restrictive immunity theory as to the right to sue a foreign sovereign.124 The
FSIA substantially changed this. Property of a foreign state used for a
commercial activity in the United States became subject to execution or
attachment in aid of execution under the circumstances set forth in the
statute.125 "Attachment in aid of execution" includes "attachments, garnishments, and supplemental proceedings available under applicable
Federal or State law for satisfaction of judgment." 126 Thus, with respect
to suits against foreign states, restrictive sovereign immunity no longer
' 127
gives a "right without a remedy."
As previously mentioned, these four purposes of the FSIA, although

solving the problems inherent in the Tate Letter, also resulted in major
changes to prior law. The three most important changes 128 brought
about by the FSIA were:
1) The elimination of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, and the establishment of a federal long-arm statute with service of process provisions
which provided the exclusive bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction
If none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Act applies, the court lacks both
statutory subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction." Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1493 (citing
Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n. 5 (1983).
This exclusive form of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA is further solidified by the undisputed fact that the FSIA now provides the sole basis for suing foreign sovereigns. See Frolova v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Verlinden, 461 U.S. 480; Ruggiero
v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Rex v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of
India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 982 (1982); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984); Goar v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores, 688 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982).
122 See quotation from H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100.
123 Id.

124 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
125 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611.

126 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6627.
127 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
128 The FSIA also adopts certain technical and procedural provisions designed to eliminate punitive damages against foreign sovereigns, to clarify venue matters, and to require that the claimant
establish his claim by evidence satisfactory to the court, even in the event of default.
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over foreign sovereigns;

12 9

2) The vesting of exclusive authority to determine whether a particular foreign sovereign is immune from suit in the judiciary; 130 and
3) The establishment of the ability to obtain execution of judgment against
specified properties of foreign sovereigns.13

Because the essence of the issue of retroactivity is the imposition of
change on the legal effect of pre-enactment conduct, these changes to
prior practice are at the heart of the present FSIA retroactivity
controversy.
IV.
A.

RETROACTIVITY AND THE

FSIA

Pre-1952 Retroactivity-Jackson,Slade, and Carl Marks

In holding that the FSIA may not be applied retroactively to pre1952 claims, the courts in Jackson, Slade, and Carl Marks 3 2 followed
similar rationales. After noting the common law antipathies to retroactive134
laws, 13 3 and finding no clear legislative intent promoting retroactivity,
these three courts employed two methodologies to determine
whether the FSIA should be retroactively applied-general legislative in1 35
tent analysis and the vested rights approach.
In employing general legislative intent analysis, all three courts
agreed that the FSIA should be denied retroactive application. As the
court in CarlMarks stated: "[T]he plain language and legislative history
of the statute provide thrusts against, rather than for, a congressional
intent that the FSIA be applied retroactively."1 36 The courts also noted
that the prospective nature of the FSIA was expressly evidenced both by
language providing that "claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States in conformity with
the principles set forth in this chapter,"1 37 and by the fact that Congress
delayed the effective date of the FSIA for a ninety-day period to give
foreign states advance notice of the FSIA's new provisions.138 Moreover,
129 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608-1611.
130 Id. § 1602.
131 Id. § 1610.
132 All three cases involved class-action suits initiated by U.S. plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns
who had repudiated public debt obligations. The retroactivity issue concerned whether the jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA could apply to pre-1952 claims.
133 Jackson, 596 F. Supp. at 387; Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 356; Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 336.
See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
134 Jackson, 596 F. Supp. at 388; Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 357; Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 336.
135 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
136 Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 337.

137 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).
138 Id. See Jackson, 596 F. Supp. at 388-89, 794 F.2d at 1497; Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 357; Carl
Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 336-37.
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the courts noted that legislative history conclusively established that the
FSIA was "not intended to affect the substantive law of liability" and
that "[r]etroactive application of the Act would repudiate the immunity
of foreign sovereigns for transactions predating 1952 and thus be inconsistent with Congress' intent not to affect the substantive law of
1 39
liability."'
Perhaps realizing the drawbacks inherent in general legislative intent analysis,14° the three courts also applied another methodology. Unfortunately, the courts' choice was the vested rights approach. The court
in CarlMarks explained the vested rights analysis of the FSIA as follows:
If the FSIA is merely remedial, it can be applied retroactively. To say that
a statute is remedial is simply to say that it does not prejudice antecedent
rights. Thus, if absolute sovereign immunity is not a matter of right, the
FSIA is merely remedial and can be applied retroactively to sovereigns'
commercial activities, because sovereigns had no antecedent right not to be
sued for the consequences of such activities. 141

Although "antecedent right" has taken the place of the term "vested
right" in this passage, and the word "remedial" is used to identify a statute that does not affect such rights, the approach used is essentially the
vested rights approach, and its circular reasoning is obvious. 4 2 The
court merely has shifted the issue to the question: What is an antecedent
right? Nevertheless although the courts in these three cases failed to define antecedent rights, they did latently apply prongs of the Linkletteri
43
Stovall test in their analyses.1
For example, in explaining why retroactive application of the FSIA
to pre-1952 transactions would affect foreign sovereigns' antecedent
139 Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 357.
140 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. For alternate interpretations of the language of the
FSIA, see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
141 Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 337.
142 When the court spoke of "antecedent rights," it was referring to "vested rights," and not
merely to rights existing prior to the enactment of the FSIA. Preceding the quoted explanation, the
court had analyzed the plaintiff's contention that "a statute may be applied retroactively ... if its
retroactive application would not interfere with 'substantive' or 'vested' rights." Id., at 336. The
portion of the opinion containing the term "antecedent rights" continued from this analysis and
likewise referred to vested rights. Id. at 337. See also Jackson, 596 F. Supp. at 389 ("a statute shall
not be retroactively applied to alter antecedent rights"), and Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 358 ("to apply
the FSIA [here] would clearly prejudice the antecedent rights of Mexico"), for examples of similar
use of the term "antecedent rights."
Other courts have used the term "antecedent rights" in FSIA retroactivity discussions such that
the term similarly implied more than a temporal meaning. See, e.g., Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti
Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne, 605 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1979).
143 See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text. The definitional analysis, supra notes 51-56,
was of no help here because the establishment of jurisdiction in these cases was clearly not merely
procedural or remedial.
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rights, the three courts determined the reasonableness and extent of reliance on the overturned law, and the effect of retroactive application of
the new rule on the administration of justice." As the Jackson court
stated:
At the time of the issuance of the bonds in 1911 up until the date of their
maturity in 1951, China relied on the well-founded expectation that the
then extant, almost universal doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity governed all interactions between her and the United States and the citizens of
the two respective countries. Concomitantly, China had no expectation of
being haled1into
45 a court in the United States to answer for any default of the
bond issue.
Similarly, the Slade court stated:
[T]o apply the FSIA to the underlying transactions would clearly prejudice
the antecedent rights of Mexico. Between 1922 and 1951, the government
of Mexico could safely assume that the then existing doctrine of absolute
immunity governed any commercial transaction between it and the United
States or its citizens. Mexico could therefore not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the United States for defaulting on public debt instruments.... The Court finds that because Mexico may have reasonably
relied on these factors in structuring its conduct prior to 1952, it would be
inequitable to divest Mexico of the
146 absolute immunity it enjoyed in 1922 by
applying the FSIA to this case.
Thus, the conclusive establishment by Jackson, Slade, and Carl
Marks that the FSIA should not be retroactively applied to pre-1952
events stands up to the principles promoted by this Comment as the correct principles to apply in clarifying the retroactive application of the
FSIA.14 7 Although these principles are developed in further detail in
Section IV(B)(2) of this Comment, they deserve a brief mention at this
point in relation to pre-1952 claims. First, because every provision in the
FSIA changes the pre-1952 doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity,
there is no confusion with regard to the definition of terms.148 Second,
there is no need to consider the non-jurisdictional provisions separately
to determine their retroactive application,14 9 because lack of jurisdiction
precludes the retroactive application of other provisions of the FSIA to
pre-1952 events.150 Last and most importantly, although the courts in
144 See supra notes 69-76 and accompaning text (Lea, the second and third prongs of the Linkletter/Stovall test).
145 Jackson, 596 F. Supp. at 389.
146 Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 356 (footnotes omitted). See also Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 339.
147 See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
148 Such is the case because the FSIA did not codify any part of the pre-1952 absolute sovereign
immunity doctrine. Thus, no provision applies merely preactively to pre-1952 claims to cause confusion in the definition of terms. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
149 See the second principle enunciated, infra notes 169 and 182 and accompanying text.
150 Recognition of the third principle enunciated (the "double-edged sword" effect) is actually
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these three cases purportedly relied only on the general legislative intent
analysis and the vested rights approach,15 1 they also employed aspects of
the Linkletter/Stovall test. Thus, the decisions are in accordance with
the fourth principle this Comment promotes. 5 ' These four principles
will be described in further detail in Section IV(B)(2).
B.

Post-1952 Retroactivity

1. A State of Confusion
Although Jackson, Slade, and Carl Marks conclusively established
that the FSIA could not be retroactively applied to claims arising prior to
the issuance of the Tate Letter,' 53 the three cases did not resolve the issue
of FSIA retroactivity with respect to claims arising subsequent to the
issuance of the Tate Letter. As the court in Carl Marks stated: "We
need not ...reach the question whether the FSIA applies to claims that
arose between 1952 and 1977, because the claims presently at issue arose
154
well before 1952."
Courts that have reached the question, instead of resolving the issue,
have exhibited considerable confusion and uncertainty. Whereas some
courts have held the FSIA to be retroactively applicable to pre-FSIA
events, other courts have held to the contrary, denying retroactive application in similar situations.
For example, the court in Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne1 5 stated that it was not the "manifest intention of the
legislature" to apply the FSIA retroactively, and that "applying the Immunities Act ...[would] prejudice very substantial antecedent rights of
beyond the scope of this Comment, because the question whether the denial to apply the FSIA
retroactively to pre-1952 claims would take away rights of plaintiffs is not analyzed here (this Comment only shows that the retroactive application of the FSIA to pre-1952 events would take away
rights of sovereign defendants). Nevertheless, because it is fairly safe to predict that such denial
would not adversely affect plaintiffs' claims, it will be assumed that the principle is not applicable
here.
151 Application of the definitional analysis, supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text, is unnecessary here because each provision of the FSIA implied more than mere procedural changes to the pre1952 absolute sovereign immunity doctrine. Of course, an entirely different situation arises with
respect to changes made to the post-1952 restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine. See infra notes
201-07, 221-22 and 234-36 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
153 These three cases constitute existing case law in its entirety on the subject of pre-1952 FSIA
retroactivity. As the CarlMarks court stated: "'The only cases relevant to the present inquiry are
Slade... and Jackson ...." Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 348 (dismissing other cases cited by the
plaintiff as involving post-1952 retroactivity).
154 Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 323. See also id., 841 F.2d at 26.
155 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979).
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the appellees." 15' 6 In contrast, the court in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti
Press Agency 157 concluded that because the FSIA did not create new
rights of immunity, but merely codified the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, applying the substantive provisions of the FSIA to an
action commenced before its effective date would not interfere with such
rights of the parties.15 8 The Yessenin-Volpin court found that "applying
the Immunities Act to the instant case [would] give effect to the congressional intent and [would] not interfere with the antecedent rights of the
parties ...."159 The Yessenin-Volpin court also stated that, "insofar as

the Immunities Act alters the rights of parties, it does so by expanding
the ability of plaintiffs to obtain satisfaction of judgments against foreign

states."16 Revealing similar inconsistencies, although numerous courts
have given retroactive effect to various provisions of the FSIA, 16 1 under

have also declined to give retroaclike circumstances, numerous courts
1 62

tive effect to the same provisions.
Moreover, other courts have applied the FSIA to claims arising
prior to its enactment without even discussing the problem of FSIA retroactivity. For instance, in Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic,16 3 the

court found that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA's commercial activity
exceptions, noting that the "FSIA gives the Court jurisdiction over any

non-jury civil action against a foreign state as long as the defendant is not
156 Id. at 654.
157 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
158 Id. at 851 n.1.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See,eg., Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (assuming FSIA could be applied retroactively); Upton v.
Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applied the
FSIA retroactively, thereby concluding that the "direct effect" test had not been satisfied and the
foreign state was immune from suit); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (retroactively applied a provision of
the FSIA that created a new basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign);
and the cases cited therein.
162 See, eg., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 791 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (concluded that the Congress did not intend for the
FSIA to confer subject matter jurisdiction retroactively); Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985) (declined to give the provisions
governing subject matter jurisdiction retroactive effect); Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (refused to apply the FSIA retroactively because "the very wording of section 1330(a) that the
'district courts shall have original jurisdiction' is prospective") (emphasis in original); Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Buma Negara, No. 77 Civ. 263 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 1977) (memo endorsement) (refused to grant retroactive application); and the cases cited
therein.
163 579 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 742 F.2d 67 (1984).
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entitled to sovereign immunity.""' The court reached this conclusion
without any discussion of the retroactive effects of the FSIA, even
though the operative events in the claim at issue occurred no later than
1966.165

As a result of these inconsistencies in the case law, the extent to
which the FSIA may be retroactively applied to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter, yet prior to the enactment of the
FSIA, remains unresolved.
2.

Understandingthe Confusion and the Development of Principlesto
Clear the Confusion

To resolve the confusion regarding FSIA retroactivity, it is first necessary to understand the confusion. This Comment suggests that such
confusion is a product of the courts' systematic failure to:
(1) develop and apply a coherent and workable definition of retroactivity
and other related concepts;
(2) recognize that whereas some sections of the FSIA may apply retroactively, other sections should not (Le., retroactivity is not an "all or none"
proposition);
(3) recognize that because of the FSIA's "sole basis" characteristic, nonretroactive application of certain sections nevertheless ultimately results in
retroactive application; and
(4) apply methods of interpretation other than the conclusory "vested
rights" analysis.
As to the first item, a major source of confusion in discussions of
retroactive law is the failure to define the underlying concepts. Courts
discussing FSIA retroactivity with regard to post-1952 events commonly
speak of the statute as "retroactive" in nature, even when it is obvious
that the portions of the FSIA under consideration are merely preactive. 16 6 For example, the court in Yessenin-Volpin concluded that the
FSIA should be given "a retrospective operation" to determine immunity
in the case, even though the court recognized that:
[T]he Act does not purport to create new rights of immunity but to "codify
the so-called 'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity... [which] was
adopted by the Department of State in 1952 and has been followed by the
courts and the executive branch ever since." . . . Indeed, insofar as the
164 Schmidt, 579 F. Supp. at 26 (quoted in Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 348).
165 Id. See Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 348. Other courts likewise have applied the FSIA to
pre-enactment events without a corresponding discussion of FSIA retroactivity. See, eg., Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
166 No such problem is encountered when dealing with pre-1952 events because the FSIA is
entirely retroactive in such instances. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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Immunities Act alters the rights of parties, it does so by expanding the
ability 16of
7 plaintiffs to obtain satisfaction of judgments against foreign
states.
Thus, the court stated that it gave the FSIA "retrospective" (i.e., retroactive) effect, even though the case involved no change to prior law-it did
not involve the satisfaction of judgment. Such inconsistent use of the
terminology surely adds to the confusion in this area.168
Closely associated with this inconsistency is the next source of confusion-the failure to recognize that whereas some sections of the FSIA
may apply retroactively, others may not. Some sections of the FSIA
merely codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and involve
no change to prior law. Courts that broadly declare that the FSIA
should or should not be applied retroactively without distinguishing between the different provisions are therefore painting with too broad a
brush.1 69 Because FSIA retroactivity is not an "all or none" proposition,
any meaningful analysis of retroactivity must consider each provision on
an individual basis.
Regarding the third source of confusion, it is undisputed that the
170
FSIA is now the sole basis for suing foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts.
When this "sole basis" characteristic is coupled with changes the FSIA
makes to prior law, FSIA retroactivity operates as a double-edged sword
in certain instances. In other words, not only is the statute "retroactive"
if the courts expressly apply its provisions to pre-enactment claims,
under certain circumstances, it is also "retroactive" if the courts expressly decline to apply its provisions to pre-enactment claims.
Consider, for example, the changes the FSIA makes to prior law
concerning jurisdiction. The statute restricts jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign to in personam jurisdiction, thus eliminating in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction. Although in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were
available and exercised under the Tate Letter, there was no clear way to
secure in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state prior to the enact-

ment of the FSIA-in effect, such jurisdiction was unavailable. 17 ' The
FSIA changed this by establishing a federal long-arm statute which provides several bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
167 Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. at 851 n.1 (citation omitted).
168 For other examples of inconsistent use of the term "retroactive" in FSIA cases, see Ohntrup v.
Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
169 See, e.g., Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir.
1979); Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
170 See supra note 121.
171 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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state. 172
Several arguments can be made against the retroactive application of
this in personam jurisdiction. Prior to the FSIA, foreign sovereigns with
assets located within the United States could reasonably expect they
might be subjected to suit via in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. They
had no reason to expect, however, that they might be called on to defend
an action via in personam jurisdiction if they had no property in the
United States. Had they been aware of this possibility, foreign sovereigns
affected by the in personam provision would have had the opportunity to
alter their behavior. In addition, it may be argued that retroactivity
should be denied with regard to this jurisdictional provision because it
creates a new cause of action.
Thus, the application of this jurisdictional provision to pre-enactment claims would retroactively affect the rights of foreign defendants as
shown above. The denial of such application, however, would also retroactively affect the rights of U.S. plaintiffs. 173 This is true because the
jurisdictional provision in the FSIA eliminates the bases of jurisdiction
that existed prior to its enactment. Because in personam jurisdiction is
now the sole basis for asserting claims under the FSIA, 7 4 if plaintiffs are
denied the ability to assert in personam jurisdiction to claims arising after
1952 but pre-FSIA, they are thereby denied a cause of action previously
175
available to them.
The resulting elimination of such causes of action certainly involves
retroactive effect to pre-FSIA claims, even though it results from an attempt to circumvent another retroactive effect-i.e., the imposition of a
new form of jurisdiction upon foreign sovereigns. As a result, the ques172 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
173 See infra note 186 and accompanying text.

174 But see Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 488 U.S. 428 (1989). The Second Circuit in AmeradaHess held that a court may have jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), over claims against foreign governments for violations of international law. The court concluded that such claims were not barred by
the FSIA even though they do not fall within an FSIA exception. Id. This holding is truly novel,
however, and is inconsistent with the rulings of the vast majority of courts. See Comment, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity After Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Did It Go Down with
the Hercules?, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 660 (1988). Moreover, the holding was recently reversed by
the Supreme Court. See 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
175 The court in National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), recognized this "double-edged sword" effect in
holding that the FSIA was applicable retroactively to afford the plaintiff a basis for acquiring in
personam jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign defendant. As the court pointed out, "once jurisdictional attachments have been eliminated, in personam jurisdiction under the Act would be the only
means of asserting jurisdiction, regardless of whether the events underlying the suit occurred prior to
the effective date of the Act." Id. at 639.
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tion here is not merely whether the jurisdictional sections of the FSIA
should apply preactively because such application entails retroactive consequences, but, as shown above, one must also recognize that the failure
to apply these sections also may entail retroactive consequences. The
courts therefore cannot merely take the position that retroactivity is evil
and deny one choice or the other since both choices involve retroactivity.
The final source of confusion is the courts' failure to employ all
available methods of interpretation in determining whether the FSIA is
to be applied retroactively to post-1952 claims. 7 6 Although the courts
apparently recognize the drawbacks of general legislative intent analysis,177 they have relied primarily upon the conclusory "vested rights" approach, rather than applying other methods of retroactive
interpretation.1 7 As previously discussed, the vested rights approach
rests upon circuitous definitions and precludes the employment of other
more meaningful analyses. 179 Although the definitional analysis occasionally shows up in post-1952 FSIA retroactivity discussions, no court
has expressly employed a Linkletter/Stovall-type test to determine
1 80
retroactivity.
Four guiding principles with regard to retroactive, preactive, and
prospective application of the FSIA therefore may be distilled from these
observations of the sources of confusion in this area. 8 1 These principles,
which should be followed by courts attempting to decide the issue of
FSIA retroactivity, are as follows:
(1) The development and application of a coherent and workable definition
of the retroactivity, preactivity, and prospectivity concepts is necessary to
arrive at the proper conclusion.
(2) The recognition that FSIA retroactivity is not an "all or none" proposition (Le., that some sections should be applied retroactively, whereas other
176 Such methods include: (1) general legislative intent analysis; (2) the vested rights approach;
(3) definitional analysis; and (4) the Linkletter/Stovalltest. See supra notes 40-76 and accompanying

text.
177 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
178 See, eg., National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1979); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v.
Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
179 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text
180 Of the 54 reported federal cases discussing FSIA retroactivity, not one court has applied the
Linkletter/Stovall test. This Comment thus proposes use of not only the definitional analysis, but
also the Linkletter/Stovall test, when confronted with these issues of statutory retroactivity.
181 In fact, these principles are actually reformations of these observations because they constitute
ways to circumvent the confusion by applying the converse of the source of the confusion.
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1 82
sections should not) is necessary to arrive at the proper conclusion.

(3) Recognition of the "double-edged sword" effect of the FSIA, which results from its "sole basis" characteristic coupled with the changes made to
prior law, is necessary to arrive at the proper conclusion.
(4) Application of all methods of retroactive interpretation, including the
definitional analysis1 83and Linkletter/Stovall test, is necessary to arrive at the
proper conclusion.
V.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

By applying the four principles enunciated above to various sections
of the FSIA, this Comment now attempts to arrive at sound answers to
the question of FSIA retroactivity.
A.

Retroactivity of FSIA Sections Codifying Maxims
of Sovereign Immunity

Whereas some sections of the FSIA drastically change the existing
law of sovereign immunity,18 4 other sections merely codify aspects of restrictive sovereign immunity embodied within the Tate Letter.18 5 A primary purpose of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. In accordance with this purpose, the sections of the
FSIA that exclude foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims
arising out of commercial or proprietary actions do not impose new liability upon foreign sovereigns. Indeed, they only clarify liability which
has existed since 1952.186
Applying the first principle advanced in the previous section (the
proper definition of concepts), it becomes evident that the question of
retroactivity is nonexistent with regard to these sections. A statute that
merely codifies existing law is not retroactive according to the legal definition of the term. Because no change in prior law is involved in the
182 FSIA prospectivity, for instance, isan "all-or-none" proposition, for it is not disputed that all
sections of the FSIA should and do apply prospectively.
183 The inadequacies of the "vested rights" approach have already been extensively discussed, see
supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Because of such inadequacies, the "vested rights" approach is not considered a meaningful method of retroactive interpretation by this Comment and
thus will not henceforth be applied.
184 See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
186 As the Court stated in Alfred Dunhill:
Although it had other views in years gone by, in 1952, as evidenced by [the Tate Letter] attached to this opinion, the United States abandoned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity
and embraced the restrictive view under which immunity in our courts should be granted only
with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's public or governmental actions
and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or proprietary actions. This has been
the official policy of our Government since that time ....
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 699 (1976).
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sections codifying the existing restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, it
is illogical to speak of "retroactive" implications. Thus, the sections of
the FSIA that codify Tate Letter maxims without change should apply
preactively to post-1952 actions, and there is no question of retroactivity
to be resolved in relation to these sections.
This process of isolating the provisions of the FSIA that do not
change prior law is consistent with the second principle advanced in the
previous section (recognition that FSIA retroactivity is not an "all or
none" proposition). By considering these provisions separately, we have
left open the question whether other sections of the FSIA may be retroactive. The third and fourth principles (recognition of the "double-edged
sword" effect and employment of all methods of retroactive interpretation) do not apply because such principles concern retroactivity, not
mere preactivity as is involved here.
B.

Retroactivity of Sections Altering Maxims of Sovereign Immunity

In contrast to the sections of the FSIA which merely codified the
existing maxims of sovereign immunity under the Tate Letter, other sections of the FSIA drastically changed the rules of sovereign immunity.
Specifically, the FSIA imposed three major changes to prior law: (1) jurisdictional changes; (2). authoritative changes; and (3) executionary
changes. Applying the first principle advanced (the proper definition of
concepts) to the sections of the FSIA that brought about these changes,
"retroactivity" issues abound. 8 7 Application of the second principle
(recognition that FSIA retroactivity is not an "all or none" proposition)
allows us to distinguish the sections involving retroactive implications.
Thus, in order to resolve the issue of retroactivity as it relates to these
sections of the FSIA, it is necessary to apply the third and fourth principles (recognition of the "double-edged sword" effect and employment of
all methods of retroactive interpretation) to these sections. After such
application, it will become clear which sections should be retroactively
applied,' 88 and which sections should merely be prospectively applied. 189
L

JurisdictionalChanges

The first major change the FSIA makes to prior practice is jurisdictional. As previously discussed, the FSIA eliminates in rem and quasiin
187 See the applicable definitions, supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
188 This retroactivity encompasses not only preactivity but also prospectivity since it is not disputed that all sections of the FSIA apply prospectively.
189 As will be shown, all three major changes thus should apply retroactively to post-1952 events.
See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

10:333(1989)

rem jurisdiction for suits against foreign sovereigns, and it creates bases
for asserting in personam jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns through the
establishment of a federal long-arm statute with service of process provisions.1 90 The retroactive consequences concerning these changes have already been noted in the explanation of the "double-edged sword"
effect.191 Application of the third principle (recognition of the "doubleedged sword" effect) thus shows that retroactive implications are encountered even when this change to prior law is held to not apply to preenactment conduct. 192 One must look, therefore, toward meaningful
methods of interpretation for an answer to the question of the retroactivity of these jurisdictional sections. Reliance upon the historic antipathies
19 3
toward retroactive laws is no way out.
In applying the fourth principle promoted (employment of all methods of retroactive interpretation) to these jurisdictional changes, it is necessary to consider the various methods of interpretation. 194 The
drawbacks of general legislative intent analysis have already been outlined. 95 Nevertheless, three prominent indications of legislative intent
appear from the face of the statute and its legislative history. These clues
point, however, in opposite directions.
First, the FSIA's preamble states that "[c]laims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided... in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."' 196 This wording seems to suggest that all
claims, regardless of when they have accrued, should, if decided subsequent to the effective date of the statute, be subject to its provisions.
197
Thus, the language appears to point toward retroactive application.
Second, the legislative history explains that the FSIA was to take effect
190 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608-1611.
191 See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text, demonstrating that retroactive consequences
result whether the new in personam jurisdiction provisions of the FSIA are applied or not applied to
actions arising prior to the enactment of the FSIA yet subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter.
192 Id.

193 For a list of these historical antipathies, see supra text accompanying notes 28-39.
194 If such differing methods point to opposite results, the Linkletter/Stovall test retains priority
because it constitutes the most meaningful analysis. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
196 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).

197 See Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Retroactive Application-Liabilityof People's Republic of Chinafor Defaulted Railway Bonds, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 456, 457 (1985), where the
author states: "Some courts have interpreted this language to authorize application of the FSIA's
provisions immediately upon the effective date of the Act, thereby allowing application to actions
pending on that date or instituted thereafter regardless of the dates of the underlying events." For
examples of this interpretation, see Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). In the latter case, the court concluded that the "henceforth" language was applicable only to the substantive immunity provisions of the FSIA, and not to
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90 days after its enactment since "[a] 90-day period [was] deemed necessary in order to give adequate notice of the act and its detailed provisions
to foreign states." 198 This provision, contrary to the preamble, indicates
that Congress did not intend for the FSIA to apply to causes of action
accruing prior to the enactment of the FSIA, because "[s]uch a postponement of a statute's effective date is evidence of the legislature's desire that
it be given prospective application only."

19 9

Finally, the legislative his-

tory also shows that "[t]he [FSIA] bill [was] not intended to affect the
substantive law of liability. ' '2 °"
Taking these manifestations of intent together, it becomes obvious
that Congress was not clear as to the retroactive effect of the FSIA. The
first and second indications of legislative intent appear to point to opposite results, whereas the third indication points to a "Catch-22" situation.
As shown by the "double-edged sword" effect, if both the application and
inapplication of the FSIA jurisdictional provisions result in retroactive
effects, the "substantive law of liability" must be affected. Thus, general
legislative intent analysis provides no solution here. We must therefore
turn to another methodology.
Employment of the definitional analysis to the jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA requires a determination as to whether these provisions
are merely procedural changes to prior practice. According to the definitional analysis, if such changes are merely procedural, they may be retroactively applied.20 1 Upon first impression, the changes imposed by the
new service of process sections appear to be merely procedural. It is difficult to imagine, however, that the elimination of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction, and the creation of bases for in personam jurisdiction under
the FSIA's long-arm statute, are procedural changes only. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.20 2 allowed the retroactive application of a state long-arm statute on the
ground that the legislation was "remedial ... and neither enlarged nor
the jurisdictional section, as to which "[t]he Preamble [of the FSIA] does not purport to say anything about the retroactive application .... " Vintero Sales, 629 F.2d at 790 (footnote omitted).
On the other hand, some courts have interpreted the "henceforth" language to imply merely
prospective effect. See, eg., Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1497; Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 357; Carl Marks, 665
F. Supp. at 336. For an explanation of these alternate interpretations of the language of the FSIA,
see supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
198 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6632.

199 Buccino v. Continental Assurance Co., 578 F. Supp. 1518, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See Ocean
& Atmospheric Science v. Smyth Van Line, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
200 S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 100.

201 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
202 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

10:333(1989)
20 3

impaired substantive rights.
The FSIA long-arm statute, however, can be distinguished from that
in the McGee case on several points. The Court in McGee justified its
retroactive application as follows:
[E]xpanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction... is attributable to
the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years
. * *With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great
increase in the amount of business.., across state lines. At the same time
modem transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.204
Applying the same logic to the FSIA, it is true that there has been a
fundamental transformation of the international economy over the years.
Accompanying the increasing internationalization of commerce has been
a great increase in the volume of business across national lines.2°5 In
addition, modern transportation and communication have made it much
less burdensome for a foreign sovereign to defend himself in a country
where he engages in economic activity. However, the same justifications
of ease in communication and transportation or the increased flow of
business are simply not present to the same degree between a state and
foreign government. Moreover, as indicated by the quoted passage, the
Court in McGee was obviously thinking primarily in domestic terms
when it retroactively applied the long-arm statute.20 6 Thus, the factors
involved in McGee are sufficiently different from those applicable to the
FSIA so that the decision should not be construed as binding precedent.
Nevertheless, although McGee may not be controlling, it is persuasive in
promoting the retroactive application of the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions via the definitional analysis.20 7
Finally, employment of the Linkletter/Stovall test to determine the
retroactivity of the FSIA jurisdictional provisions requires the assessment and balancing of three factors-purpose, reliance, and effect.208 In
consideration of the first prong of this test, a court must search for the
purpose of the new law and the impact retroactivity would have upon
203 Id. at 224.
204 Id. at 222-23.
205 See generally Maier, The Politicsof Productivity' Foundationsof American InternationalEconomic Policy After World War I, 31 INT'L ORG. 607 (1977).
206 For example, the Court referred to "our national economy" and "state lines." McGee, 355
U.S. at 222-23.
207 Commentators have criticized the substance-procedure distinction the definitional analysis
employs. See, e.g., Note, Retroactive Expansion of State Court JurisdictionOver Persons,63 COLUM.
L. REV. 1105, 1117-19 (1963) [hereinafter Retroactive Expansion].
208 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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that purpose.
Of the five purposes of the FSIA previously discussed in this Comment, the third and fifth (to provide well-defined rules for service of process and to create bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction, and to not
affect the substantive law of liability) are relevant here. As is readily
apparent, the jurisdictional changes made to prior law were a product of
the third purpose, and their retroactive application would be consistent
with such purpose, thereby filling the gap in prior law. However, because foreign defendants could thus be held liable in situations where
they were not previously capable of being held liable (ie., in situations
where jurisdiction could be, imposed via the in personam jurisdictional
provisions), retroactive application of the provisions is in conflict with
the fifth purpose of the FSIA. Specifically, such retroactive application
would affect the substantive law of liability. Nevertheless, when one considers the "double-edged sword" effect and realizes that the denial to
apply the provisions retroactively would also affect the substantive law of
liability, the fifth purpose becomes insignificant. Thus, the purpose
prong of the Linkletter/Stovall test weighs in favor of retroactive
application.
As to the reliance prong of the test, the party seeking relief from
retroactivity must demonstrate that he or she actually depended upon
the existing state of the law and took some action, or refrained from
taking some action, in compliance with what that party believed the law
to be.2 1° Under the Tate Letter, only in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction
could be successflly asserted over a foreign sovereign.2 11 Thus, prior to
the enactment of the FSIA, foreign sovereigns had no reason to expect
that they might be called on to defend an action in a state where they had
no property. Theoretically, there is a strong possibility that foreign sovereigns relied on the old rule of law. Thus, upon initial examination, it
appears that the second factor of the test weighs against retroactive
application.
Upon closer examination, however, one realizes that there is also a
209 As this Comment has previously noted, the FSIA explicitly encompassed four basic purposes:
(1) to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as embodied within the Tate Letter; (2) to
depoliticize the issue of sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for its resolution exclusively in the hands of the judiciary; (3) to fill a gap in the prior law by providing well-defined rules
for service of process upon foreign states and to create bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction
over foreign states; and (4) to rectify the logical inconsistency formerly existing between the rules of
immunity from suit and execution. See supra notes 106-127 and accompanying text. In addition,
legislative history also reveals a fifth purpose of the FSIA-to not affect the substantive law of
liability. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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strong possibility that U.S. plaintiffs relied upon the old rule of law. Potential plaintiffs who dealt with foreign sovereigns with assets located
within the United States had reason to believe that they could bring suit
against such foreign sovereigns for commercial activity. Again, recognition of the "sole basis" holding and the "double-edged sword" effect
points to the fact that if retroactive application of the new in personam
jurisdictional provisions is denied, U.S. plaintiffs will be left without a
cause of action. Thus, upon closer examination, it appears that the second factor of the test may also favor retroactive application. Nevertheless, because it is nearly impossible to prove actual reliance upon the old
law as the second prong requires, and because it is likely that the actions
of both U.S. plaintiffs and foreign sovereign defendants would have been
the same whether the old rule prevailed or not, the second factor of the
test appears to be neutral.
Lastly, in considering the effect prong of the test, a court must make
a determination as to the equities involved or examine the effects of retroactivity upon the administration of justice.2 12 One commentator has
summarized the possible injustice resulting from the retroactive application of a long-arm statute:
[A]s the relationship between defendants and the state becomes more attenuated, thereby reducing the state's need to protect its citizens, and as the
likelihood of the defendants' reliance on the prior lack of jurisdiction increases, situations may arise in which exercise of jurisdiction so opposes
"traditional notions of fair play" that due process is violated.213
Although this reasoning brings out possible inequities associated with the
retroactive application of the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions, it is unlikely these inequities exist. In fact, as will be shown, the equities favor
retroactive application.
First, the "direct effect" requirements of the FSIA's long-arm provisions ensure that the relationship between the U.S. plaintiff and the foreign sovereign defendant is not highly attenuated. 14 Second, as
discussed under the consideration of the second prong of the Linkletter/
Stovall test, the defendant's reliance upon the old law not only is speculative, but is neutralized by the plaintiff's corresponding reliance upon the
old law.2 15 Third, the plaintiff in FSIA suits most likely is the party who
has been wronged because he or she is the party that seeks help from the
judicial system. Based on these observations and the fact that no real212 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
213 Retroactive Expansion, supra note 207, at 1123. Note how the reliance and effect prongs of
the Linkletter/Stovall test are greatly intertwined.
214 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
215 See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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world implications appear to indicate adverse impact on the administration of the new jurisdictional provisions, the equities weigh in favor of
retroactive application here.
As a result, the provisions of the FSIA which eliminate in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction and provide bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns through the establishment of a federal
long-arm statute should be retroactively applied to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter. As shown, the definitional analysis promotes retroactivity here, as does employment of the Linkletter!
Stovall test.216
2. Authoritative Changes
The second major change the FSIA makes to prior practice is that it
vests exclusive authority in the judiciary to determine whether a particular foreign sovereign is immune from suit. 217 Application of the third
principle (recognition of the "double-edged sword" effect) to these
authoritative provisions has no cognizable effect. The failure to apply
these new provisions to pre-enactment conduct would not result in a retroactive effect as would, for instance, the failure to apply the new jurisdictional provisions to pre-enactment conduct.2 18 The judicial
determination of sovereign immunity was already available under the
prior practice, and the enactment of the new provision did not disregard
an existing immunity determination with the corresponding imposition
of a new one.2 19

In applying the fourth principle (employment of all methods of retroactive interpretation) to the authoritative changes, it is again necessary
to consider the differing methods of interpretation. 22 0 Under the definitional analysis, it appears that these authoritative changes are entirely
procedural in nature because they merely change the process by which it
is determined whether a particular foreign sovereign is immune from
suit. To a large extent, however, these provisions of the FSIA might also
216 Although the second prong (reliance) was proven to be neutral in this instance, both the first
(purpose) and third (effect) prongs of the test weigh in favor of retroactive application.
217 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
218 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
219 That is, the enactment only made the existing immunity determination by the State Department unavailable to foreign sovereigns.
220 The three prominent indications of legislative intent were brought out in the application of the
legislative intent analysis to the jurisdictional changes. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying
text. The same general discussion and conclusion that this analysis provides no solution likewise
applies here.
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be characterized as creating substantive or fundamental rights that
greatly affect the positions of the parties.
Under the prior procedures, a foreign government could employ its
diplomatic resources to seek a recommendation from the State Department that the court should dismiss a particular case on the ground of
sovereign immunity.2"' With the enactment of the FSIA, however, these
diplomatic channels have been closed. Determination according to objective judicial standards is now the exclusive means of immunity determination available to foreign sovereigns. It may be argued that the
substitution of judicial determination only for judicial determination plus
State Department influence affected much more than "mere modes of
procedure." Employment of the definitional analysis thus is not conclusive with respect to the retroactivity issue as it relates to these authoritative changes.
Finally, employment of the Linkletter/Stovall test to the FSIA authoritative provisions requires the assessment and balancing of the purpose, reliance, and effect factors. 2 2 As to the purpose prong of the test,
only the second purpose of the FSIA-to depoliticize the issue of sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for its resolution exclusively
in the hands of the judiciary and thereby providing a unitary determination of claims223is relevant here. It is readily apparent that the retroactive application of the authoritative changes would be consistent with
this purpose. Such application not only depoliticizes the determination
of immunity, but it also provides for a uniform system of determination. 2 4 Thus, the first prong of the Linkletter/Stovall test weighs in
favor of retroactive application.
In considering the reliance prong of the test, a court must search for
reliance on the old rule of law, which allowed a foreign government to
employ its diplomatic resources to obtain immunity from suit. 225 Even if
the new FSIA provisions precluding this diplomatic resourcefulness are
declared to be mere procedural changes, it is important to recognize that
procedural laws may induce reliance. Nevertheless, as was the case with
the jurisdictional provisions, because it is nearly impossible to prove actual reliance upon the old law, and because it is likely that foreign sover221 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 209.

224 This reasoning seems to lie on the borderline of circuitousness. Nevertheless, consideration of
the first prong of the test may be accomplished only through using this single relevant purpose. The
fifth purpose is not relevant here since retroactive application of the authoritative provisions in no
way changes the substantive law of liability.

225 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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eign defendants' actions would have been the same whether the old rule
prevailed or not,2" 6 the second factor of the test appears to weigh in as
neutral.
Two other important factors, however, tip the balance. First, by
eliminating the role of the State Department in determinations of immunity, the FSIA "[brought] the United States into conformity with the
immunity practice of virtually every other country. 2 2 7 Because the
United States abided by the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and,
in general, the restrictive theory does not allow for such politicization in
immunity determinations, foreign sovereigns had reason to believe that
this inconsistency was not likely to last forever.2 2 8 Second, although the
executive branch often did make determinative suggestions to the judiciary on immunity issues under the prior practice, such suggestions in no
way constituted a right held by foreign sovereigns. If the State Department failed to present a recommendation for immunity in a case, the
judicial determination prevailed.22 9 Thus, the standards for granting immunity which existed prior to the FSIA-involving two different
'23 0
branches of the government-"were neither clear nor uniform.
Surely a foreign sovereign would not place a great amount of reliance
upon these unclear and irregular standards of determination. Thus, the
reliance prong of the test favors retroactivity.
Lastly, as to the effect prong of the test, retroactivity is favored if the
court is unable to identify a consequence that either is fundamentally
unfair or is laden with real-world implications for the operation of administrative or judicial bodies. 31 With respect to the consequence of unfairness, although it may be inequitable to foreign sovereigns to eliminate
existing diplomatic channels, it was and would continue to be more inequitable to U.S. plaintiffs to allow the existence of such channels. By bas226 It is difficult to believe that a foreign sovereign would not engage in commercial activity in the
United States merely because it was afraid that if it were sued based upon such commercial activity,
it could not pressure the government of the United States to shield it from liability.
227 Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 100, 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06.
228 See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1493, where the Court said of these suggestions: "This proved troublesome, because foreign nations at times placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department, and
political considerations led to suggestions of immunity where it was not available under the restrictive theory .... " (citing Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983)).
229 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
230 See Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Citizens' Nonfederal Claims, supra note 91, at 598.
Commentators have criticized the political undertones of the State Department's then-existing system of determining sovereign immunity issues and the inconsistent results which were produced by
having both the executive and judiciary branches involved.
231 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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ing determinative decisions of sovereign immunity on politics or current
foreign relation policies, the objective and independent characteristics of
the judiciary are abandoned. Moreover, the plaintiff in FSIA suits is
likely to be the party who has been wronged. Thus, the equities involved
appear to weigh in favor of retroactive application.
As to the second possible consequence, although retroactive application does not have adverse implications as to administration, the denial
of retroactive application may have such implications. Under the old
practice for determining immunity, two branches of government were
involved, and the governing standards were "neither clear nor uniform."
It may thus be argued that the operative complications in having two
branches make the immunity determinations and the inconsistent standards that emerge properly point toward retroactive application. Therefore, the effect prong seems to favor retroactivity.
In sum, the provisions of the FSIA that vest exclusive authority in
the judiciary to determine whether a particular foreign sovereign is immune from suit should be retroactively applied to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter. Although employment of the
definitional analysis provides no clear solution to the issue of retroactivity with respect to these provisions, employment of the Linkletter/Stovall
test conclusively establishes that retroactive application of these provisions is the correct result.
3.

Executionary Changes

The third major change the FSIA makes to prior practice is that it
permits the execution of judgment against commercial property of foreign sovereigns. 232 The third principle (recognition of the "double-edged
sword" effect) is inapplicable to these executionary provisions. The failure to apply these new provisions to pre-enactment conduct results in no
change to prior law since execution of judgment was not available under
the prior practice. In other words, if the provisions are not retroactively
applied, plaintiffs are in the same position after the FSIA's enactment as
they were before the FSIA's enactment; execution would not be possible.
In applying the fourth principle (employment of all methods of retroactive interpretation) to these executionary changes, it is necessary as
before to consider the differing methods of interpretation.2 3 3 Under the
232 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
233 The first and second indications of legislative intent again appear to point to opposite results.
See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of these indications. The third
indication of legislative intent (i.e., the legislative intention not to affect the substantive law of liability) weighs against retroactive application of the executionary provisions. To supply a remedy where

FSIA Retroactivity
10:333(1989)
definitional analysis, it appears at first that these executionary changes
are entirely remedial in nature, because in providing for the execution of
judgment, they merely affect the remedies available to the plaintiff.
Closer examination, however, again may lead to a different result.
For instance, as the court in Nevins v. Revlon, Inc.234 stated:
"Where a statute may greatly affect the position of the parties, it will not
be construed retrospectively ....[T]o supply a remedy where previously
there was none of any kind is to create a right of action." 2 35 Analogously, the executionary provisions of the FSIA supply a remedy where
the realization of the plaintiff's award previously was dependent upon
the goodwill of the foreign government involved. 236 Thus, the executionary provisions appear to create a right of action, and therefore, they
should not be retroactively applied. This result conflicts with the first
observation that such changes appear to be merely remedial in nature.
This conflict, taken together with the fact that this new mode of execution is severely restricted (as will be discussed further), indicates that the
definitional analysis of retroactivity is inconclusive, producing a neutral
result.
Finally, the Linkletter/Stovall test must be applied to determine the
retroactivity of the FSIA executionary provisions. In considering the
purpose prong of this test, the fourth and fifth purposes of the FSIA (to
rectify the logical inconsistency formerly existing between the rules of
immunity from suit and execution, and to not affect the substantive law
of liability) are relevant here. As is readily apparent, the executionary
changes made to prior law are consistent with the fourth purpose, and
their retroactive application would be consistent with this purpose.
However, because foreign defendants could ultimately be forced to
account for judgments in situations where they were not previously obligated to do so, retroactive application of the provisions appears to be in
conflict with the fifth purpose of the FSIA. In actuality, though, the
creation of such a right to execution of judgments does not affect the
substantive law of liability, because all liabilities imposed under the new
law already could have been imposed under the prior law.2 37 The new
previously there was none of any kind is to create a right of action. This provision thereby has a
perceptible impact on the substantive law of liability. Thus, general legislative intent analysis appears to weigh against retroactivity.
234 23 Conn. Supp. 314, 182 A.2d 634 (Super. Ct. 1962).
235 Id. at 317, 182 A.2d at 636.
236 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
237 This is true unless, of course, the new in personam jurisdictional changes provide for the
imposition of liability in a situation where it was impossibile to impose such liability before. See
supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, as the discussion of these jurisdictional
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provisions carry out this liability only by providing for recovery of an
award granted upon a finding of such liability. Thus, the purpose prong
of the test favors retroactive application.
As to the reliance prong of the test, foreign sovereigns with assets
located within the United States previously had no reason to expect that
such assets could be seized for the satisfaction ofjudgments against them.
Despite the Tate Letter's adoption of the restrictive theory as to the right
to sue a foreign sovereign, the absolute theory continued to apply to the
execution of judgments after its issuance.23 8 The executionary provisions
of the FSIA substantially changed this by making property of a foreign
state used for a commercial activity in the United states subject to execu239
tion or attachment under the circumstances set forth in the statute.
As with the jurisdictional provisions, there is therefore a theoretical possibility that foreign sovereigns relied on the old rule of law.24 Due to
this possible reliance, the second prong weighs against retroactive
application.
In addition to the defenses against this tendency brought out in the
jurisdictional and authoritative provisions discussions, 24 1 however, two
other factors point toward retroactive application. First, as already mentioned, the new executionary provisions rectified the logical inconsistency
that existed between the application of restrictive immunity rules to immunity from suit, and absolute immunity rules to the execution of judgments.24 2 Foreign sovereigns had reason to believe that this
inconsistency was not likely to last forever. Moreover, even under the
Tate Letter, execution of judgment was allowed against certain foreign
sovereigns according to the terms of a number of U.S. treaties which
permitted the execution of judgments against corporations owned by foreign sovereigns.2 4 3 The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone2 ' also recognized the liability to execution, under
appropriate circumstances, of sovereign-owned vessels used for commercial activity. It must be noted that aside from these specific situations,
the United States prior to the enactment of the FSIA had taken the posichanges shows, the "double-edged sword" effect neutralizes any effects on the substantive law of
liability.
238 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
239 28 U.S.C. § 1610.

240 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
241 Id.

242 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
244 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 20 &
21, 15 U.S.T. 160.6, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964).
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tion that property of foreign sovereigns was absolutely immune from execution.2 45 Nevertheless, these two factors strongly weigh against the
reliance of foreign sovereigns on the prior law. Thus, the second prong
of the test favors retroactivity here.
Lastly, applying the effect prong to the FSIA's executionary provisions, it seems unfair to subject property of a foreign sovereign to execution or attachment in aid of execution when the property previously was
not subject to such execution. Two factors, however, overcome this apparent unfairness. First, when one looks at the actual requirements surrounding this execution, much of the bite is taken out of any apparent
inequities. For instance, in determining whether execution is permissible
under the FSIA, certain types of property continue to be immune from
execution. Funds of a foreign central bank held for its own account in
the United States are exempt from execution,2 4 6 as is property of a foreign state if it is "of a military character" or "under the control of a
military authority or defense agency."247
Moreover, for execution to be allowed, the property must fall within
one of five specific categories. These five categories are: (1) property over
which the defendant state has waived immunity against execution;2 4 8 (2)
property which was used for the commercial activity that gave rise to the
claim upon which the judgment is based; 4 9 (3) property which was taken
in violation of international law, or which was exchanged for property
taken in violation of international law; 5 0 (4) real property that is the
subject of an action determining rights in the property, where the property was acquired by gift or succession and was used by the foreign state
in commercial activity;2 51 and (5) proceeds of liability insurance policies
owned by foreign states.2 5 2 In examining these five exclusive categories,
no fundamental unfairness appears to result from their retroactive
application.
The application of the first category to pre-enactment events does
not even involve retroactivity because execution in such instances was
245 Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d
469, 473 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959).
246 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
247 Id. § 1611(b)(2).

248 Id. § 1605(a)(1).

249 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
250 Id. § 1610(a)(3).
251 Id. § 1610(a)(4)(A).

252 Id. § 1610(a)(5).
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already available under pre-FSIA law.2 53 With regard to the third exception, which involves property associated with a violation of international
law, it would be difficult to think of a situation where the equities would
weigh in favor of the sovereign defendant that committed the violation.
The same difficulty would result with respect to the fourth and fifth categories. As to the fourth category, such property would be the subject of
a determination that the property properly belonged to the plaintiff. As
to the fifth category, the equities also weigh in favor of the plaintiff due to
the plaintiff's injury and the fact that execution on a liability insurance
policy does not involve taking property directly from the foreign
sovereign.
Thus, only the second category remains available to shift the equities in favor of foreign sovereigns. It seems, though, that the reasons
favoring retroactivity which were brought out in the reliance discussion
relating to the executionary provisions apply equally to making the commercial property which is the subject of the suit against the foreign sovereign subject to execution. This category involves only property that had
not been subject to execution previously because of inconsistency in the
law,2 54 or that was specifically included within existing international
agreements.2 5 5
Moreover, as in the jurisdictional provisions, the plaintiff in FSIA
suits most likely is the party who has been wronged. Property falling
under the second category will be subject to execution only where a trier
of fact has already found that the plaintiff has been wronged. By applying this portion of the FSIA retroactively, U.S. plaintiffs no longer will
merely have a "right without a remedy. ' '2 56 Adding in these two factors,
the third prong of the test clearly favors retroactivity.
As a result, the provisions of the FSIA that permit the execution of
judgment against commercial property of foreign sovereigns should be
retroactively applied to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the
Tate Letter. As shown, although the definitional analysis produces a
neutral result, employment of the Linkletter/Stovall test conclusively establishes that retroactive application of these provisions is the correct
2 57
result.
253 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. See also the applicable definition of "retroactivity," supra note 26-and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
256 This was the case under the Tate Letter. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
257 The first (purpose), second (reliance), and third (effect) prongs of the test all weigh in favor of
retroactive application.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The issue of FSIA retroactivity with respect to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter is currently engulfed with uncertainty and confusion. This Comment has attempted to resolve this
confusion and to provide a solution to the issue of FSIA retroactivity.
Through the delineation of the sources of the confusion, four basic principles which may be applied to circumvent the confusion were identified.
These principles encompass: (1) the proper definition of concepts; (2)
recognition that FSIA retroactivity is not an "all-or-none" proposition;
(3) recognition of the "double-edged sword" effect; and (4) application of
all methods of retroactive interpretation. When such principles are systematically applied to various provisions of the FSIA, the proper conclusions as to which sections should be retroactively, preactively, or merely
prospectively applied to claims arising subsequent to the issuance of the
Tate Letter become clear.
This application establishes that provisions of the FSIA which do
not alter maxims of sovereign immunity, but which merely codify portions of the Tate Letter, should be preactively and prospectively applied.
This is because such provisions concern no change to prior law, and thus,
no retroactivity issue is involved. Regarding the provisions of the FSIA
which do change existing maxims of sovereign immunity, application of
the four principles strongly favors retroactivity. Thus, the provisions of
the FSIA which:
1) eliminate in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction and provide exclusive bases for asserting in personam jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns through
the establishment
of a federal long-arm statue with service of process
2 58
provisions;
2) vest exclusive authority in the judiciary to determine whether a particular foreign sovereign is immune from suit; 25 9 and
3) permit 26
the° execution of judgment against specified properties of foreign
sovereigns
should be retroactively applied
to claims arising subsequent to the issu2 61
ance of the Tate Letter.
This Comment not only suggests that courts applying the FSIA
should acknowledge these principles so that less conclusory and more
meaningful analyses of FSIA retroactivity may be applied, but it also
suggests that all courts should acknowledge such principles when con258 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608-1611.
259 Id. § 1602.
260 Id. § 1610.
261 The provisions should likewise be prospectively applied. Preactive application is also presumed by the retroactive application. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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fronted with issues of statutory retroactivity. Proper definition of the
underlying concepts, recognition of the "all-or-none" proposition and
"double-edged sword" effect, and applying methods of retroactive interpretation other than the "vested rights" approach, such as the Linkletter/Stovall test, would all enable courts to arrive at consistent and
conclusive solutions.
Michael E. Jansen

